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The NCAA Basketball Tournament selection committee an-
nually selects the Division I men’s teams that should receive
at-large bids to the national championship tournament. Al-
though its deliberations are shrouded in secrecy, the commit-
tee is supposed to consider a litany of team-performance statis-
tics, many of which outsiders can reasonably estimate. Using a
probit analysis on objective team data from 1994 through 1999,
we developed an equation that accurately classified nearly 90
percent of 249 “bubble” teams during that time frame and over
85 percent for the 2000 tournament. Given the NCAA Tourna-
ment’s nickname of the big dance, the equation is effectively
the “dance card” that determined whether a team got an invi-
tation from past committees and is also a tool that could aid
decision making for future committees. The accuracy of the
dance card, and the factors and weights included in it, suggest
that the committee is fairly predictable in its decisions, despite
barbs from fans, teams, and the media.
An annual debate rages among fol-lowers of intercollegiate athletics re-
garding which of the approximately 310
National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) Division I men’s basketball teams
should be among the 64 selected to partici-
pate in the postseason national champion-
ship tournament (the NCAA Tournament).
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Overall winning percentage Overall RPI rank (among all Division I teams)
Overall ratings percentage index (RPI) Number of losses overall
Number of wins overall Number of nonconference losses
Number of nonconference wins Nonconference winning percentage
Conference winning percentage Nonconference RPI rank
Nonconference RPI Number of conference losses
Number of conference wins Conference RPI rank
Conference RPI Number of road losses
Number of road wins Number of losses in the last 10 games
Number of wins in the last 10 games Losses against teams ranked 1–25 in RPI
Wins against teams ranked 1–25 in RPI Losses against teams ranked 26–50 in RPI
Wins against teams ranked 26–50 in RPI Losses against teams ranked 51–100 in RPI
Wins against teams ranked 51–100 in RPI Losses against teams ranked 101–150 in RPI
Wins against teams ranked 101–150 in RPI Losses against teams ranked 151-up in RPI
Wins against teams ranked 151-up in RPI
Table 1: The NCAA’s nitty gritty report for each team that is a candidate for an at-large selec-
tion includes information on 29 factors.
Approximately 30 teams get automatic in-
vitations (or bids) to the NCAA Tourna-
ment by winning their respective confer-
ence championships. (The number of
Division I teams and the number of auto-
matic bids occasionally changes from year
to year.) However, the NCAA Tournament
selection committee fills all remaining open
(or at-large) slots in the field of 64 teams,
making its final decisions during meetings
that are not open to the public or the me-
dia. Although the committee chairpersons
typically answer media questions after
they announce the tournament field, they
generally reveal little about their
deliberations.
However, the general process by which
the committee is supposed to come to its
conclusions is public and is described on
the NCAA’s Web site [NCAA 1999]. As a
part of this process, the committee is to re-
fer to descriptive statistics and other infor-
mation about the teams eligible for at-
large selection. This information (Table 1),
which for the most part outsiders can rea-
sonably well estimate or compute, is com-
piled into a single report that summarizes
the relevant information for all teams com-
bined. This so-called nitty gritty report
[NCAA 1999] represents the largely objec-
tive inputs into the otherwise subjective
process of team selection.
The purpose of our research was to use
the available objective information in the
nitty gritty reports of the six college bas-
ketball seasons from 1994 through 1999,
along with the ex post knowledge of
which teams made the tournament in
those years, to quantitatively model the se-
lection criteria of the committee. In the jar-
gon of college basketball, where the NCAA
Tournament is often called the big dance,
this model would effectively be the “dance
card” that at least partially captures the
factors that the committee has considered
most important in past years. It also could
be used as a decision aid in future selec-
tions or as a means of determining if fu-
ture committees weigh factors differently.
The latter issue is important given that
the committee changes composition each
year. Although the committee’s decisions
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therefore can be expected to vary some-
what from year to year, it is incumbent
upon the committee to wield decisions
that are reasonably consistent with those
of past committees. The model we propose
could contribute to that consistency by in-
dicating how previous committees tended
to make decisions. The model does not in-
clude variables to reflect differences
among committees, since our objective
was to create a model that could be uni-
versally applied in the future regardless of
who might sit on the committee.
Several prior studies have been con-
ducted on NCAA Tournament issues, such
as predicting the margin of victory based
on seedings [Smith and Schwertman 1999],
predicting the probability of a team being
among the tournament’s final four teams
[Carlin 1996; Schwertman, McCready, and
Howard 1991; Schwertman, Schenk, and
Holbrook 1996], and describing behavior
exhibited in tournament betting pools
[Metrick 1996]. However, these analyses
were based on the assumption that the
tournament field had already been se-
lected. We have found no study address-
ing the question of how the committee
weights various criteria when making its
at-large selections.
Data
It is well known among those that fol-
low college basketball that the most im-
portant statistic to the committee is the
ratings percentage index (RPI) of each
team, a metric that the NCAA devised to
aid in the evaluation of teams. The RPI is
roughly approximated as 25 percent of the
team’s winning percentage, plus 50 per-
cent of its opponent’s average winning
percentage, plus 25 percent of its oppo-
nents’ opponents’ winning percentage.
Only those games played against fellow
NCAA Division I member teams are con-
sidered in the calculation. The NCAA
makes adjustments to the opponents’ win-
ning percentages to account for those
games played against the team being eval-
uated. Similar adjustments are made to the
winning percentages of the opponents’ op-
ponents, if indeed those teams have
played the team being evaluated. More-
over, the NCAA gives bonuses based on
such factors as wins against teams ranked
in the top 50, beating good teams away
from home, and playing a majority of non-
conference games against top 50 oppo-
nents. It also gives penalties for losing to
non-Division I teams or teams ranked be-
low 150, for losing to bad teams at home,
and for playing a majority of nonconfer-
ence games against teams ranked below
150. Unfortunately, the NCAA keeps these
adjustments confidential [SportsLine
1999b; Palm 1999].
Although the “true” RPI that the com-
mittee considers is unknown, because of
this confidentiality, many sources try to
approximate the statistic so that they can
distribute RPI rankings through the me-
dia. One of the best known of these
sources is Jerry P. Palm, who provides the
college-basketball statistical information
that is published on the CBS Sportsline
Web site and is recognized as CBS’s RPI
guru [SportsLine 1999a]. (CBS has the
broadcasting rights to the NCAA Tourna-
ment, as well as to the NCAA Tournament
selection show.) Given Palm’s position, we
viewed his “CollegeRPI” Web site [Palm
1999] as a reliable source for the data used
in our analysis.
In addition to RPI statistics for each
team and conference, Palm generates data
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Binary variable reflecting whether a team had at least 20 wins
Binary variable reflecting whether a team had at least a break-even conference record (at least as
many conference wins as conference losses)
Number of road games
Number of games played against teams ranked from 1–25 in RPI
Number of games played against teams ranked 26–51 in RPI
Number of games played against teams ranked 51–100 in RPI
Difference between numbers of wins and losses
Difference between numbers of conference wins and conference losses
Difference between numbers of wins and losses against teams ranked 1–25 in RPI
Difference between numbers of wins and losses against teams ranked 26–50 in RPI
Difference between numbers of wins and losses against teams ranked 51–100 in RPI
Difference between numbers of wins and losses against teams ranked 101–150 in RPI
Difference between numbers of wins and losses against teams ranked 151-up in RPI
Table 2: We included 13 variables in our analysis in addition to the 29 in the nitty gritty report.
for the 29 objective factors in the nitty
gritty report available to the committee
(Table 1). We collected data for each of
these objective factors from Palm [1999]
for 453 teams that had overall winning
percentages of at least 50 percent for each
of six regular seasons (those completed in
March 1994 through March 1999) but that
did not receive automatic bids to the tour-
nament. The committee has never chosen
a team with a winning percentage below
50 percent as an at-large selection [Palm
1999], and thus, this factor served as an
initial filter for the selection model.
In addition to the objective information
in Table 1, the nitty gritty report includes
information for each team that is largely
subjective or unavailable to those outside
the committee. This includes advisory
rankings by selected coaches in each re-
gion of the country, the combined number
of wins and losses against “tournament”
teams (teams that received automatic bids
into the tournament or have already been
selected to receive at-large invitations), the
combined number of wins and losses
against teams that are under serious con-
sideration for at-large positions, and inju-
ries that may have affected a team’s per-
formance over the course of the season
[NCAA 1999]. (The committee uses an
iterative nomination-and-voting process to
incrementally select at-large teams.) This
input likely influences the selection pro-
cess to some degree, but because it was
unavailable outside of the committee, we
did not include it in our selection model.
Finally, we collected information from
various media sources regarding which of
the 453 available at-large selections the
committee actually picked to participate in
the tournament in the six seasons studied.
Methodology
We treated each of the 29 objective fac-
tors as a potential predictor variable for
our model. In addition, we computed sev-
eral additional variables that we hypothe-
sized might have affected the committee’s
decisions (Table 2). The 20-win plateau has
long been considered a total indicative of
a very successful season. Television ana-
lysts for college basketball telecasts fre-
quently opine that a team should have at
least a break-even record within its confer-
ence to be selected for the tournament. A
superficial measure of the difficulty of the
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schedule played by a given team might in-
clude the total number of road games and
the total number of games played against
teams ranked at various general positions
based on the RPI (for example, teams
ranked in the top 25). Finally, it could be
argued that the total number of wins or
losses (whether overall, within the confer-
ence, or against a certain level of competi-
tion) is not as important as the differential
between wins and losses. The additional
variables addressed each of these
concerns.
We designated the variable to be pre-
dicted by the model as a binary variable
representing whether the team was se-
lected by the committee to participate in
the tournament in the respective year.
Given the limited values that this depen-
dent variable could take on, we selected a
probit analysis as an appropriate model-
ing approach. Before we estimated the
probit model, however, we further filtered
the data to make the modeling process
and outcomes more representative of the
actual process and outcomes. Specifically,
we considered only teams with RPI rank-
ings worse than 25 and better than 80 in
developing and assessing the model. The
highest ranked team not to receive a bid
between 1994 and 1999 was Texas Tech,
with a ranking of 29 in the RPI of 1997.
The lowest ranked team to receive a bid in
that period was New Mexico, with a rank-
ing of 75 in the RPI of 1999. Our filtered
data set thus bracketed these rankings,
with a small buffer at each extreme. Limit-
ing our analysis to such teams accom-
plished two things. First, since model per-
formance hinges significantly on the
number of teams that are correctly pre-
dicted to receive an at-large bid, eliminat-
ing the no brainers at both ends of the RPI
spectrum avoided criticism that the accu-
racy of the model included ridiculously
easy predictions. Second, this focused our
model almost exclusively on bubble teams
(a term commonly used by the media to
describe teams for which a bid is question-
able), since the true committee delibera-
tion process is directed at these teams.
Using the probit analysis, we developed
a model whose predicted values repre-
sented the z-scores associated with a bub-
ble team’s probability of making the tour-
nament. We followed the process described
in the appendix to identify a model that
best predicted those teams that the com-
mittee selected and had at least a modi-
cum of face validity (for example, a vari-
able representing wins against opponents
ranked in the top 25 shouldn’t have a neg-
ative coefficient). The latter issue was im-
portant, given the potential uses of the
model by the committee, the teams, the
media, and the public.
The Dance Card
Using our analysis, we produced the
following equation as the best estimate of
the dance card the NCAA Tournament se-
lection committee used between 1994 and
1999 (Appendix):
The z-score associated with the probabil-
ity of a bubble team receiving a tourna-
ment bid
3.07074590.074646(RPI Rank)
 0.012203(Conference RPI Rank)
0.235189(Top 25 Wins)
0.1442626(Conference Wins—Losses)
0.4093414(Top 50 Wins—Losses)
0.264996(Top 100 Wins—Losses). (1)
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We identified six variables from the dance
card as statistically significant in the team-
selection process. The first variable (RPI
Rank) represents the overall ranking of a
given team among all teams in Division I
based on the RPI metric. The second (Con-
ference RPI Rank) represents the ranking of
a given team (among all Division I teams)
based only on its performance against its
conference competitors. The expected neg-
ative coefficients for each of these vari-
ables imply that as the rank value in-
creases by one unit (implying that the
team’s rank has actually worsened by one
position), the z-score drops, as does the as-
sociated chance of getting into the
tournament.
The third variable (Top 25 Wins) repre-
sents the total number of victories against
teams ranked in the top 25 (according to
the RPI). The final three variables repre-
sent the difference between the number of
wins and the number of losses against op-
ponents within a team’s conference (Con-
ference Wins—Losses), against teams ranked
26 through 50 according to the RPI (Top 50
Wins—Losses), and against teams ranked
51 through 100 according to the RPI (Top
100 Wins—Losses). The positive coefficients
of these variables indicate that the z-score,
and the associated chance of receiving a
tournament bid, increases as these vari-
ables increase.
To calculate or predict a given team’s
overall probability of getting a tournament
bid, we first simply entered the relevant
information for that team into the dance-
card equation. We then converted the
resulting z-score, or standard normal ran-
dom variable, in each case into a probabil-
ity of receiving a tournament bid using the
standard normal cumulative distribution
function. In other words, a team’s pre-
dicted probability of getting a bid was the
area under the standard normal curve that
was less than or equal to that team’s pre-
dicted z-score. We then ranked bubble
teams in each season according to these
predicted probabilities to determine those
teams that the committee should have se-
lected for the tournament in that season, if
indeed the committee was perfectly con-
sistent. (Simply ordering the bubble teams
according to their predicted z-scores
would have yielded precisely the same
rankings.) A similar process could be fol-
lowed to determine the teams that should
be selected in future seasons.
The dance card’s coefficients represent
the marginal effect on the z-score of a one-
unit change in any of the six factors on the
right side of the equation. However, users
of the model would likely be interested in
knowing the impact of a one-unit change
in any factor on the associated probability
of getting bid. The marginal impact of a
one-unit change in an individual factor on
the probability of tournament entry is not
the same linear constant for all teams be-
cause it depends on the value of the spe-
cific factors for each team. For example,
the dance card indicates that an additional
top 25 win increases the z-score of a bub-
ble team by 0.235 units. Suppose that the
various factor values for some team are
such that the additional top 25 win takes
the team from a z-score of 0.00, which has
an associated probability of 50 percent, to
a z-score of 0.235, which has an associated
probability of 59.3 percent. Thus, for that
team, the additional win increases its
chance of getting a bid by 9.3 percentage
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Year
Bubble
teams
Correctly
classified
Teams selected by
the dance card, but
not by the committee
Teams selected by
the committee, but
not by the dance card
1994 41 90.24% Oklahoma (31) Seton Hall (45)
Georgia Tech (37) George Washington (56)
1995 42 85.71% St Joseph’s (36) Stanford (47)
Virginia Tech (38) Manhattan (54)
New Mexico State (46) Minnesota (66)
1996 40 95.00% Tulane (53) Boston College (45)
1997 44 86.36% Texas Tech (29) Temple (35)
West Virginia (49) Oklahoma (48)
Hawaii (51) Georgetown (55)
1998 42 90.48% Hawaii (41) Oklahoma (51)
Vanderbilt (44) Western Michigan (59)
1999 40 90.00% Rutgers (43) Oklahoma (49)
DePaul (45) New Mexico (75)
In-Sample Totals 249 89.55% 13 Teams 13 Teams
Out-of-Sample
2000 41 85.37% Kent (34) Seton Hall (48)
SW Missouri State (36) Indiana State (49)
Bowling Green (55) Pepperdine (53)
Table 3: We compared committee results with dance-card results (RPI rankings shown in pa-
rentheses) and found the dance card’s accuracy of 85 to 95 percent to be consistent across sea-
sons and to extend to the out-of-sample projections.
points. Suppose that for another team, the
additional top 25 win increases its z-score
from 3.00, which has an associated proba-
bility of 99.86 percent, to a z-score of 3.235,
which has an associated probability of
99.94 percent. In that case, the additional
win yields only a 0.08 percentage point
improvement in the chance of a bid. In
other words, an additional top 25 win
would be very beneficial for a somewhat
marginal team but really wouldn’t make
much difference for a team that had al-
ready virtually guaranteed itself a bid to
the tournament. A similar principle is true
for the other factors in the model.
Dance Card Accuracy
We summarize the performance of the
dance card across all six of the seasons we
studied in Table 3. We measured model
accuracy as follows. After we placed all
teams with automatic bids and all teams
with RPI rankings of 25 or better in a
given year’s field of 64, we assigned the
remaining bids to the teams with the high-
est predicted probabilities, as generated by
the dance card. For example, in 1994 there
were 30 automatic bids, and 18 teams
ranked in the top 25 in RPI did not receive
an automatic bid. We thus assigned all 48
of these teams to the 1994 tournament
field before considering the dance card.
We assigned the remaining 16 positions in
the 1994 field to those 16 teams (out of the
41 bubble teams available in 1994) withthe
highest predicted probabilities according
to the z-scores calculated using the dance
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card. We followed a similar process to se-
lect the field in each of the other five years
in our sample. We then compared the
teams that we assigned to the available at-
large positions in each year using this pro-
cedure to the teams the committee actually
selected to fill those same positions.
We found that by using the dance card
we correctly classified 223 of the 249 bub-
ble teams during the years 1994–1999 com-
bined (an accuracy rate of 89.55 percent).
This accuracy percentage became even
The average person can use
the model without knowing
anything about statistics.
more impressive when we included our
filter, which correctly classified all teams
with RPI rankings better than 26 and
worse than 79. By including all 1,650
teams that did not receive automatic bids
to the tournament in our six-year sample
and using the filter combined with the
dance card, we correctly classified 98.42
percent of all available at-large teams in
Division I men’s basketball between 1994
and 1999.
The dance card model was also quite
consistent across the six seasons, with be-
tween two and six teams misclassified in
each year (Table 3). This provided some
evidence that the model did not rely too
heavily on the committee criteria of a sin-
gle year and is general enough to be ap-
plied across years.
We also measured the dance card’s ac-
curacy by applying the model to the 2000
tournament as an out-of-sample evalua-
tion. Using a similar procedure to that de-
scribed above, we used the dance card to
correctly classify 35 of the 41 bubble teams
(or 85.37 percent) for 2000. When we in-
cluded the filter with the model, we cor-
rectly classified 283 (or 97.92 percent) of
the 289 teams that participated in Division
I but did not receive automatic bids to the
tournament in the season ending in March
2000. In other words, the out-of-sample
accuracy was equivalent to the in-sample
accuracy for the seasons of 1995 and 1997
and similar to the overall accuracy of the
model for those seasons included in the
sample on which the model was built. The
strength of the out-of-sample predictions
lends additional credence to the dance
card.
Finally, viewing the dance card from a
different perspective makes its accuracy
even more impressive. Any single error by
the dance card by definition had to result
in at least two teams being misclassified.
That is, any team that the dance card indi-
cated should get in but that the committee
did not select had to be matched by a team
that the committee did select and that the
dance card indicated should not have re-
ceived a bid. For example, the bid that
Boston College received in 1996 should
have gone to Tulane, according to the
dance card. If we view this as effectively
one misassignment and not two, the dance
card missed on only 13 selections in the
six-year combined sample and on only
three selections in the out-of-sample sea-
son. Stated otherwise, the dance card,
when combined with the filter, accurately
predicted 192 of the 205 (or 93.7 percent)
available at-large tournament slots for
1994–1999, and 32 of the 35 (or 91.4 per-
cent) available at-large slots for the 2000
tournament.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The filtered probit model represented by
the dance card appears to be a reasonable
approximation of the criteria the NCAA
Tournament selection committee weigh
when making at-large selections for the
tournament field. Not only was model per-
formance quite good, particularly given
that our analysis focused on teams for
which a bid was most questionable, but
the factors that we identified as most im-
portant had significant face validity.
Clearly the committee considers the RPI,
The dance card is an
estimation of the committee’s
decision rule.
as the NCAA’s own metric, heavily in its
own right as a filter and an important pre-
dictor variable and as a means of identify-
ing the importance of individual games.
We offer no comment on whether using
the RPI is reasonable or correct but only
accept it as major factor in the process.
Although it is difficult to conclude from
our analysis exactly how the committee
weighed various factors (in that some of
the dance card’s variables may be simple
proxies for something else that the com-
mittee did weigh), the other factors in-
cluded in the model are consistent with
those often highlighted by basketball ob-
servers. For example, the dance card re-
wards wins against good teams (teams
ranked in the top 25) but does not penal-
ize losses against such teams. However,
for games against more marginal teams, it
rewards wins and punishes losses. The fact
that the win/loss differential in games
against teams ranked 26 through 50 in the
RPI garnered a heavy weight is not sur-
prising, because such teams represent
some of the best of the other bubble teams.
One would expect the committee to closely
consider a given team’s record in these
games as a means of comparing potential
at-large invitees. A similar point could be
made regarding games against teams
ranked 51 through 100 in the RPI, and as
would be expected, the dance card gives
less weight to those results. It seems likely
that the differing weights placed on wins
and losses against teams ranked at various
positions in the RPI at least partially re-
flect some of the unreported subjective ad-
justments the NCAA makes to the RPI. Fi-
nally, our results imply that conference
performance and the strength of a team’s
conference (as it affects a team’s confer-
ence RPI rank) are significant factors.
Again both are consistent with observa-
tions basketball followers commonly
make.
An advantage of the dance card is that
it is fairly easy to use for media, teams,
fans, and committee members not familiar
with statistical methods. All a user has to
do is enter the appropriate factor values
for a team or group of teams, and the
model will provide a result (a z-score) for
each team that can then be used to evalu-
ate a team or rank a group of teams. The
user doesn’t have to convert the z-score
into a probability to use the model. In-
stead, the user can regard the z-score as
simply a strength or power index for the
team. When evaluating a single team, a
user can view a power index (z-score)
value of 0.00 as a sort of cutoff figure. If
the team has a positive power index, then
the team has a good shot at getting a bid,
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and the more positive the index, the better
the chances are. If the power index is
around zero, the team’s chances are mar-
ginal. If the power index is negative, the
team has very little chance of making the
tournament. Finally, users can rank groups
of teams by simply using the power in-
dexes, since the order will be the same us-
ing z-scores or using the associated proba-
bilities. Thus, the average person can use
the model without knowing anything
about statistics.
The dance card is not our model; it is an
estimation of the committee’s decision
rule, and its accuracy was limited by the
degree to which committees over six sea-
sons were consistent in their decisions. In
developing the model, we were also lim-
ited by our inability to consider subjective
information the committee may have em-
ployed. However, its high degree of accu-
racy, its face validity, and its consistency
across the six seasons examined indicate
that committees were fairly consistent in
making selections and tended to consider
reasonable, objective criteria. This might
surprise many observers, given the cri-
tiques of the tournament field that follow
its announcement every year.
Whether the dance card will garner sig-
nificant interest among parties to the selec-
tion process remains to be seen, but early
indications suggest that it may. WJXT, the
local (Jacksonville, Florida) CBS television
affiliate, showed immediate interest when
we contacted them on the eve of the 2000
NCAA Tournament selection announce-
ments. We told them about the mathemat-
ical formula we had developed that could
be used to help predict the teams that
would be selected for the NCAA Tourna-
ment the next day. We were promptly fea-
tured as the lead news story on the 6:00
pm Sunday broadcast that immediately
preceded the selection show at 6:30 pm,
and we were graded on our predictions on
the 11:00 pm broadcast. Given that media
response and given that the dance card
correctly identified over 90 percent of the
at-large teams selected that night, we be-
lieve our model has a chance of gaining
more widespread attention.
APPENDIX
The probit model is one of several tech-
niques available for predicting the occur-
rence of events (such as a tournament bid)
that are captured by binary dependent
variables. In the general probit technique,
one assumes that a latent, unobserved
variable exists. The value of the underly-
ing latent variable remains unknown be-
cause only the occurrence of the associated
event is recorded. The probit model is
used to predict the value of the unob-
served latent variable. Any predicted
value for the latent variable in excess of a
predefined threshold leads to prediction
that the event will occur.
The predicted values for the latent vari-
able that result from use of the finished
model are effectively standard normal
variables (or z-scores), not probability esti-
mates, and are linear in each of the regres-
sors. However, using the standard normal
cumulative distribution function, one can
convert these z-scores into predicted prob-
abilities of the event occurring. By virtue
of the nonlinear nature of the standard
normal distribution, the predicted proba-
bilities are not linear in any of the regres-
sors used in the model.
To estimate the coefficients of the probit
model that help to predict the underlying
latent variable (the z-scores), one uses a
maximum-likelihood technique. The re-
sulting coefficient estimate for each regres-
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sor, however, provides the marginal im-
pact of a one-unit increase in that regressor
on the predicted value of the unobserved
latent variable, and not on the probability
of the occurrence of the event being
modeled.
We selected the best model, via an itera-
tive process, as the one with statistically
significant coefficients (at the five-percent
level) in the direction of the expected sign
and the highest percentage of accurate
designations (Table 4) using the bid-
allocation process described in the text.
We found the pseudo R2 value of 0.6144
by comparing the value of the log likeli-
hood function associated with the esti-
mated model to the one that would exist if
the right-hand side of the equation was
limited to an intercept.
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Variable names Coefficient estimate t-statistic
Intercept 3.0707459 4.47
RPI rank 0.074646 6.11
Conference RPI rank 0.012203 1.76
Top 25 wins 0.235189 1.94
Conference wins-losses 0.1442626 3.80
Top 50 wins-losses 0.4093414 4.26
Top 100 wins-losses 0.264996 3.57
Log likelihood function  65.11
Constrained log likelihood function  168.86
Degrees of freedom  242
Pseudo R-squared  0.6144
Table 4: All coefficients estimates for our best model for predicting the latent unobserved vari-
able underlying a tournament bid were significant at the five-percent level in the direction of
the expected sign.
